Securing Reconfigurable Terminals - mechanisms and protocols by Gultchev, S et al.
Securing Reconfigurable Terminals – mechanisms and protocols 
 
 
Stoytcho Gultchev1, Chris Mitchell2, Klaus Moessner1, Rahim Tafazolli1 
Mobile VCE Teams at:  1Centre for Communication Systems Research  
The University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, UK 
2Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham TW20 0EX, UK 
 
email: {S.Gultchev, K.Moessner, R.Tafazolli}@eim.surrey.ac.uk, C.Mitchell@rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Software reconfigurability of air interfaces, the actual 
reconfiguration processes and the procurement of 
reconfiguration software are posing substantial threats 
to the system integrity of wireless communication 
system.  These threats are investigated and reported in 
this paper and mechanisms to ensure secure 
reconfiguration procedures are described.  The security 
mechanisms documented form part of the MVCE 
Reconfiguration Management Architecture (RMA).  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Future multi-function and multi-mode mobile terminals, 
based on SDR technologies, will consist of individual 
dynamically configurable components that may use 
different access technologies (i.e. wireless LAN, 
cellular or satellite air interfaces or wireline/Bluetooth 
connections) to download configuration and radio 
software components that are necessary to reconfigure 
from one air interface standard (Radio Access 
Technology - RAT) to another. Reconfigurability will 
depend on three main enablers:  
a) an open programmable software radio platform,  
b) downloadable radio configuration software and  
c) an architecture to manage reconfiguration processes 
and to ensure compliance with the radio standards 
and regulations.  
Therefore, reconfigurable terminals will require a secure 
environment to support their communications and their 
access to reconfiguration related information within the 
network. One of the main challenges facing 
reconfigurability is in understanding the security 
requirements and potential threats that the heterogeneity 
in the access networks introduces, encompassing 
networks on the scale of conventional cellular networks 
down to personal networks. The security issues arising 
are considerable, especially given that some of the local, 
personal traffic may be within a configuration of 
multiple devices or components belonging to a single 
user, and reconfiguring such a (multi-device-)‘terminal’ 
for that user. This leads to conclusion that many of the 
applications and services, needed for reconfiguration of 
the ‘terminal’, accessed by the user are likely to require 
additional security measures over and above what is 
provided by the underlying network infrastructure [1]. 
This paper provides a solution to these security issues, 
focusing on the security management tasks of 
reconfigurable terminals.   
 
II.   SECURITY & RECONFIGURABILITY 
Software Radio Terminals being able to reconfigure to 
various/any radio access systems [2], will require robust 
security mechanisms to protect the mobile terminal 
from unauthorised access and to ensure the integrity of 
the internal processes involved in reconfiguration when 
exchanging information with the network.  Different 
types of reconfigurations of a terminal will lead to 
different reconfiguration procedures (i.e. the complexity 
of a reconfiguration process may vary from small 
adaptation of parameters to a complete reconfiguration 
of the RAT) but all of them will have at least one 
common feature – each of these reconfiguration 
procedures has to implement configurations and to 
process messages that are passed into or out of the 
terminal. This includes the exchange of signalling 
messages between terminal and network, and the 
download of reconfiguration software modules from 
network to terminal node. 
Reconfigurability of radio terminals intrinsically 
provides the possibility of unintentionally but also 
deliberately corrupting the radio environment.   To 
prevent such situations, reconfigurable systems will 
require security policies and a security entity, able to 
cope with a number of threats, including: 
- unauthorised interception of data (the user may 
wish to keep the precise configuration of its 
terminal private, and the transferred software may 
itself be confidential); 
- malicious modification to data (unauthorised 
changes to software could cause a terminal to be 
rendered inoperable);  
- impersonation of terminal or network (a malicious 
terminal impersonator may be able to persuade a 
terminal to use defective software).  
To meet these security threats, a number of security 
services are required:  
- confidentiality (to prevent 
unauthorised interception),  
- integrity (to prevent unauthorised 
modification),  
- origin authentication (to detect 
impersonation).  
The security protocol and 
mechanisms for securing the 
reconfigurable terminal as part of the 
Reconfiguration Management 
Architecture (RMA) [3], are described 
in sections III and IV of this paper. 
The RMA is an architecture that 
provides the infrastructure for 
reconfiguration of SDR terminals, 
performs the reconfiguration processes and implements 
the actual configurations on the reconfigurable radio 
platform (information can be found in [3-5]).  It also 
provides the required security services and addresses the 
above-mentioned security threats.  To manage and 
control reconfiguration procedures, the RMA consists of 
multiple functional parts, which are located within the 
network and the terminal, respectively.  Within the 
terminal resident part of the RMA, a functional entity 
implements and provides the security related tasks; it 
ensures that only authorised access to the 
reconfiguration management system takes place and that 
code downloaded had not been corrupted during the 
download.  The functionality of the Security Manager 
module within the RMA, responsible for establishment, 
maintenance and termination of the secure connection to 
the outside world (i.e. the network resident parts of the 
reconfiguration management architecture) and for the 
connections within the ‘terminal’, is described.  This 
Security Manager (SECMAN) is defined as an 
independent process within the RMA; it requires its own 
processor and memory space. 
III. RECONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
ARCHITECTURE (RMA) – Security Manager 
The Security Manager (SECMAN) is responsible for 
safeguarding access to the functions of the 
reconfiguration management part within the terminal 
and also to prevent attempts at fraudulent access from 
the outside world.  Additionally, it provides the required 
security-related information to the network, stores the 
security information of the terminal (i.e. public keys and 
private keys) and the necessary external encryption 
keys.  The SECMAN is responsible for establishing 
secure connections between the terminal and the 
network using the security protocols and mechanisms 
described below. 
The Security Manager’s internal architecture is depicted 
in Figure 1.  It consists of an ‘Access Manager Entity’, 
which deals with the establishment of secure 
connections between the terminal and the network. 
Also, it processes the messages between Configuration 
Manager, the network resident parts of the RMA (i.e. 
the AcA) and the other functional entities within the 
Security Manager (see Figure 1).  The second module is 
an ‘Encryption & Decryption Factory’ (EDF), which 
implements the security features (as defined in the 
section IV), the EDF (and its equivalent within the 
AcA) encrypts both messages and reconfiguration 
software, before any transmission between terminal and 
network can take place.  For messages and software 
transmissions originated within the network, the EDF 
decrypts the streams and passes the data to the ‘Router’ 
(i.e. the third functional module within the SECMAN).  
This router’s main task is to direct packets to the various 
internal entities within the RMA (i.e. to the 
Configuration Manager, Local Software Repository, 
Configuration Rule Handler and Tag File Handler, see 
[4]).  The router de-multiplexes the incoming message 
flow and redirects messages to the appropriate target (as 
a side effect, the router removes much of the complexity 
from the EDF, distributes the tasks within the Security 
Manager and introduces through its modularity 
additional flexibility to the structure).  In summary, the 
Security Manager performs the following tasks: 
• Establishment of secure connections within the 
RMA;  
• Encryption of message and data transfer within the 
RMA; 
• Distributing of reconfiguration messages and 
software between the modules within the RMA; 
• Encryption and decryption of messages and data 
based on the Security Protocols and Mechanisms; 
• Performing the communication/reconfiguration 
management related signalling with the other 
modules within the RMA, see [5]. 
 
Once the Security Manager receives a request, from the 
Configuration Manager, to establish a secure connection 
between the terminal and the network, it follows the 
‘Security Protocols and Mechanisms’ outlined in section 
IV.  It first performs a mutual authentication procedure 
between terminal part of the RMA and the network 
part(i.e. the AcA server).  The next step is to respond to 
the Configuration Manager; this response contains a 
flag indicating whether a successful authentication has 
taken place and, if so, a connection may subsequently 
be established.  If the network sent the request, a similar 
procedure has to be performed (however in the opposite 
direction). 
If messages are exchanged between LSWR, CRH, TFH, 
CM and the network, they are processed and packaged 
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Figure 1   Security Manager block diagram 
into a secure frame by the SECMAN and then 
transmitted to the network.  If a packet arrives from the 
AcA server, the Access Manager authenticates and 
forwards it to the EDF where the necessary decryption 
is performed; after that the message is passed to the 
‘Router’ for furthe r distribution to the appropriate 
functional entity.  The secure connection remains open 
until the Configuration Manager requests its 
termination. 
 
IV.   SECURITY PROTOCOLS AND 
MECHANISMS 
A PKI-based security scheme 
We next outline a way in which the three security 
services described above are provided by the RMA’s 
Security Manager module.  This security scheme is PKI 
(Public Key Infrastructure) based, in that it assumes that 
all terminals and AcAs are equipped with an 
asymmetric key pair and a certificate for their public 
key.  This has the advantage that it will enable a 
terminal and an AcA to secure exchanged data even if 
they have no prior ‘security context’; moreover this can 
be achieved without any need for on-line 
communications with third parties.  This is likely to be 
particularly advantageous in the future wireless 
environment. 
This will require each terminal and each AcA to have an 
associated Certification Authority (CA).  This has two 
immediate consequences: 
• Each terminal and each AcA will have a trusted 
copy of the public signature verification key of 
their CA; 
• Each terminal and each AcA will possess a 
certificate for their own public key, signed by their 
CA. 
When the terminal and AcA conduct the first phase of 
the protocol described below, they will need to have a 
reliable copy of each other’s public key.  This will 
typically be achieved by exchanging public key 
certificates and then verifying them.  If the two entities 
share the same CA then there will be no problem.  
However, if the two entities use different CAs then they 
will first need to obtain trusted copies of their respective 
CA’s public key.  This can be achieved by the use of 
cross-certificates. 
The security protocol 
The security solution itself can be divided into two 
phases.  In the first phase the terminal security manager 
(SECMAN) and the AcA set up a shared secret session 
key.  This key is then used in the second phase to 
protect the data exchanged between the two parties. 
Phase 1 – Session key establishment 
We propose the use of a key establishment mechanism 
standardised in ISO/IEC 11770-3, [6], namely what is 
specified there as Key agreement mechanism 5.  Whilst 
this seems a reasonable approach, this could be replaced 
by many other protocols with similar properties. 
This protocol requires use of a function F: H×G → G, 
with properties as specified in [6].  The scheme also 
requires the choice of an element g∈G, known by all 
parties.  Both entities are required to have a private key 
agreement key h∈H, and a public key agreement key p 
= F(h, g).  That is, we assume that the terminal has 
private key agreement key hT∈H and public key 
agreement key pT = F(hT, g), and that the AcA has 
private key agreement key hA∈H and public key 
agreement key pA = F(hA, g). 
As discussed above, we assume that the terminal and 
AcA have trusted copies of each other’s public key 
agreement keys, i.e. the terminal has a trusted copy of 
pA and the AcA has a trusted copy of pT.  This can be 
achieved by exchanging public key certificates. 
The protocol operates as follows.  
1. The terminal randomly and secretly generates a 
value rT∈H, computes F(rT, g), and sends F(rT, g) 
to AcA. 
2. The AcA randomly and secretly generates a value 
rA∈H, computes F(rA, g), and sends F(rA, g) to the 
terminal.  
3. The terminal computes the shared secret key as w( 
F(hT, F(rA, g)), F(rT, pA) ).  
4. The AcA computes the same shared secret key as 
w(F(rA, pT), F(hA, F(rT, g)) ). 
Note that steps 1 and 2 can be performed in either order 
(or in parallel).  The same remark applies to steps 3 and 
4. 
Phase 2 – Data protection 
As a result of phase 1, the Security Manager and the 
AcA will share a secret key.  This secret key can now be 
used to protect all data transferred between AcA and 
terminal.  Note that we assume that this secret key is 
actually used to derive two distinct keys: one for data 
encryption and one for MACing of data. 
Both AcA and Security Manager will need to store a 
number of security-related variables for the lifetime of 
the ‘security session’.  This will include:  
• The shared secret keys; 
• A counter for traffic sent from terminal to AcA 
(initialised to zero during phase 1); 
• A counter for traffic sent from AcA to terminal 
(initialised to zero during phase 1). 
These variables form the ‘security context’.  
When a data string is sent from one party to the other 
the following steps shall be performed. 
The data string shall be prefixed with a security header.  
This shall include the current counter value and a 
direction indicator (e.g. ‘0’ for AcA to terminal and 1 
for terminal to AcA).  The counter in the security 
context shall then be incremented. 
The security header and data string shall be input to the 
MAC function (using the shared secret MACing key).  
The output MAC shall be adjoined to the data, e.g. as a 
‘security trailer’.  
The entire string resulting from the previous step shall 
be encrypted using the shared secret encryption key. 
When a data string is received it shall be processed as 
follows. 
The received string shall be decrypted using the shared 
secret encryption key.  The decrypted string shall be 
parsed into a security header, a data string, and a MAC 
value (if this parsing fails then the string shall be 
rejected). 
The recovered security header and data string shall be 
input to the MAC function (using the shared secret 
MACing key).  The output MAC shall be compared 
with the received MAC value; if the two values disagree 
then the received data shall be rejected. 
The security header shall be parsed to recover the 
counter value and the direction indicator.  If the 
direction indicator is incorrect then the data shall be 
rejected.  The counter value shall be compared with the 
expected counter value in the security context.  If the 
value is smaller than the expected value then the data 
shall be rejected.  If the value is larger than the expected 
value then a warning shall be generated to indicate that 
data has been lost.  If the data is accepted then the 
counter in the security context shall then be reset to one 
larger than the received counter value. 
Some suggestions for algorithms 
In order to implement the protocol proposed in the 
previous section, a number of cryptographic algorithms 
will need to be used.  In this section we propose choices 
for these algorithms. 
Signature scheme, as required to sign certificates used 
in Phase 1.  It is suggested that an RSA-based signature 
scheme can be used, namely the scheme standardised in 
ISO/IEC 9796-2, [7]. 
Cryptographic hash-function, required as part of the 
signature scheme.  Almost all signature schemes require 
the use of a cryptographic hash-function.  The scheme 
in ISO/IEC 9796-2 [7] is no exception.  It is suggested 
that the SHA-1 hash-function is used, as standardised in 
ISO/IEC 10118-3, [8]. 
Function F, sets G and H, and special element g∈G, 
as used in Phase 1.  It is suggested to use the 
multiplicative group of integers modulo a large prime 
(see also Annex B of [6]).  This requires the selection of 
a large prime p, with the property that p-1 has a large 
prime factor q1.  The element g is then chosen to be an 
integer satisfying 1 < g < p-1 such that g has 
multiplicative order q modulo p (i.e. gq mod p = 1 and gs 
mod p ≠ 1 for any s<q).  We then put 
G = {g mod p, g2 mod p, g3 mod p, …, gq mod p = 
1},i.e. |G| = q, and H = {1, 2, …, q-1}, and hence |H| = 
q-1.  
Finally we define  F(h, g) = gh mod p. 
One-way function w, as used in Phase 1.  It is 
suggested that this is implemented simply by 
concatenating the inputs to the function and applying 
the hash-function SHA-1 (see above). 
                                                     
1  Here large is user-selectable, but for the purposes of an experimental 
implementation choosing p to be of the order of 21000 is probably appropriate, 
with q almost as large. 
Encryption function e, as used in Phase 2.  It is 
suggested that the AES block cipher should be used for 
data encryption, in the CBC mode.  AES (Rijndael) will 
be specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 [9], and the cipher 
block chaining mode is specified in ISO/IEC 10116 
[10]. 
MAC function f, as used in phase 2.  It is suggested 
that MAC Algorithm 2, as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-1 
[11], is used.  The block cipher used as part of this 
construction should be the AES (Rijndael) algorithm. 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discussed the reconfigurability related 
security threats in the SDR terminal, and the various 
security issues, such as where additional security 
features were required, and solutions to address these 
threats were proposed and described.  It presented the 
security entity of MVCE’s RMA and described the 
implementation of the RMA – Security Manager 
module.  Finally, Security Protocols and Mechanisms 
for the Security Manager’s functionality were described.  
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